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In recent times, more attention in the management and educational psychology 
literature has been devoted to understanding how and why creative potential is not 
being achieved, despite the pressing need for innovative thinking and an increased 
capacity to transfer knowledge more adaptively.  Scholars have argued that creativity 
and the capacity to use knowledge adaptively is often minimal, unless cognitive 
flexibility (Day & Goldstone, 2012), variability and cognitive incongruity is 
introduced (Hatano & Inagaki, 1992).  Related to these ideas, recent research has 
demonstrated that distrust serves as a processing influence that enables individuals to 
think more flexibly and creatively (Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011).  The goal of the 
current research was to investigate whether distrust effects the capacity to process 
information in more flexible ways, leading to an increase in knowledge transfer.  
Across three experimental studies, I primed a psychological mindset by having 
participants complete a scrambled sentence task made of words synonymous with 
distrust, trust, or neutral meaning. Study 1 measured the effect of distrust on the 
capacity to solve an immediate analogical transfer problem.  Study 2 measured 
whether distrust aids in discrediting irrelevant information, when solving an 
immediate analogical transfer problem.  Study 3 measured the effect of distrust on the 
capacity to solve an analogical transfer problem over a delay of time (4 days).   
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  מה אם
 )1981מתוך הספר "אור בעליית הגג" (
 
 אמש, כששכבתי חושב כאן,
 כמה תהיות חלפו במוחי
 וקיפצו וחגגו כל הלילה
 :ושר את שיר התהיות הנושן שלהן
 ?מה אם הייתי טיפש בבית הספר
 ?מה אם היו סוגרים את בריכת השחיה
 הייתי מוכה?מה אם 
 ?מה אם היו מרעילים את כוס השתיה שלי
 ?מה אם הייתי מתחיל לבכות
 ?מה אם הייתי חולה וגוסס
 ?מה אם הייתי נכשל בבחינה
 ?מה אם שיער ירוק היה צומח על החזה שלי
 ?אחד לא היה אוהב אותי ףמה אם א
 ?מה אם ברק היה מכה בי
 ?מה אם לא הייתי גובה
 ?מה אם ראשי היה קטן
 מה אם הדג לא היה נושך?
 שלי?מה אם הרוח תקרע את העפיפון 
 מה אם הם יתחילו מלחמה?
 מה אם ההורים שלי יתגרשו?
 מה אם האוטובוס יאחר?
 צמחו ישר?ימה אם השיניים שלי לא י
 קרעו?ימה אם המכנסיים שלי י
 מה אם לעולם לא אלמד לרקוד?
 הכל נראה בסדר, ואז
 תהיות הלילה מתחילות שוב!
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INTRODUCTION 
Psychological impressions of distrust and doubt have become common within 
and among organizations (Kramer, 1999; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 
1998).  Distrust, the sense of uncertainty with a situation and an expectation that one 
needs to be on alert for change, is a mindset that many organizational leaders 
necessarily adopt.  Competition in a global marketplace, technological advances, 
changing demographics, and the speed of information transfer are just some of the 
influences that make “change inevitable.” Coincidently, one strategy engendered in 
the title of former Intel CEO, Andy Grove’s book, “Only the Paranoid Survive...,” 
underscores the value of instilling a sense of doubt into routine organizational actions 
and cognitions, in order to keep up with the rapid pace of change. As demonstrated by 
Intel’s success in the microprocessor industry, a healthy dose of paranoia is presumed 
to make employees reflect on what they know and do not know.  
Related to Grove’s assertion that distrust is beneficial for learning and 
innovation, the current body of work explores the effect of distrust on using 
knowledge more adaptively and flexibly.  While critical thinking is regarded as a 
valuable skill found in employees, there exists little guidance and empirical evidence 
from the management literature as to the conditions that enhance it. The current work 
examines distrust as a cognitive processing influence that facilitates adaptive thinking 
and knowledge transfer. I define a mindset of distrust in terms related to skepticism, in 
which one compares the fit and validity of new information with prior knowledge; yet 
differs to the extent that distrust also recursively adapts prior knowledge to fit new 
information by challenging the premises of what one assumes to be true. Quite 
different than a mindset of mistrust, in which individuals sense guise and deception 
within their social environment and thus tend to narrow attentional focus, distrust 
expands attentional focus and facilitates learning. Under a distrustful mindset, an 
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attentional shift takes place where cognitive flexibility is enhanced and information is 
processed and construed in broader and more adaptable terms. A more flexible lens for 
processing information leads individuals to clarify their own assumptions, better 
identify patterns between sources of information, and more effectively transfer 
knowledge.  
Given the vast amount of theory and research developed on the concept of trust 
and learning, it may seem at odds to predict positive and adaptive effects of distrust on 
knowledge transfer.  Yet, empirical findings in this domain indicate that individuals 
under distrustful mindsets engage in deeper reasoning processes and show more 
flexible, creative styles of thinking (Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2004; Mayer & 
Mussweiler, 2011). Individuals with a distrustful mindset can transform information 
into different categorical schemes, think with a counterfactual lens and in non-routine 
ways, and apply sophisticated attributional considerations to incoming information 
that surpass conventional thought (Fein, 1996; Schul et. al., 2007).  From a practical 
standpoint, because innovation is predicated on using non-routine measures for finding 
solutions, applying a skeptical mindset to routine cognitive and behavioral patterns 
can help channel the type of cognitive shift needed for effective and creative problem 
solving.  
Critical Inquiry, Cognitive Incongruity, and Learning 
Many learning scientists argue that fast-changing work environments require 
rethinking attitudes and approaches to learning and innovation to facilitate meaningful 
and productive performance (Bransford & Vye, 2008). There is an ever greater need 
for individuals to become self-directed, lifelong learners and to develop the capacity to 
learn how to learn to solve new problems.  Innovation requires using existing 
knowledge adaptively and flexibly, as opposed to rigidly maintaining existing 
practices, routines, and knowledge.  Individuals who question and think critically 
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about the role they have in dynamic environments are likely to benefit by using an 
open-minded perspective to prepare for changing conditions.  
Hatano and Inagaki (1986) were among an early group of scholars who 
theorized about contextual conditions that influence an adaptive learning mindset and 
knowledge expertise.  Hatano and Inagaki (1986) argued that when there is little 
variability in an environment, individuals are more likely to use their knowledge in 
routine and highly efficient ways.  Under these conditions, individuals develop into 
“routine experts” as there exists little need or motivation to deeply understand one’s 
source of knowledge, or have a critical understanding of what one is doing and why it 
is relevant.  As a result of maintaining the same knowledge over time without 
adaptation, routine experts are less able to use their knowledge to solve new types of 
problems.  In contrast, organizational contexts that consist of change and variability 
require a need for adaptive expertise.  In these settings, non-routine work 
environments challenge individuals to learn the conceptual underpinnings of their 
knowledge.  That is, if they are to solve new problems they are challenged to learn 
why and how their skill set is effective under particular conditions and are required to 
continuously learn and update their knowledge for it to be relevant. Adaptive experts, 
therefore, utilize a meta-cognitive and mastery goal orientation that guides them to 
become competent in what they know and to be able to apply their knowledge in novel 
ways.    
Hatano and Ignaki (1986) explored the concept of adaptive expertise in their 
study of abacus masters and their capacity to solve novel problems.  They 
differentiated expertise into two dimensions: routine expertise and adaptive expertise.  
Individuals labeled “adaptive experts,” had a proficient skill set, yet also understood 
the meaning and nature of their work, so were capable of inventing new procedures for 
solving new problems. In contrast, Hatano and Ignaki (1986) found that routine 
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experts had developed a high, yet narrow procedural proficiency with their skill which 
enabled them to solve familiar problems very quickly and easily, but less able to solve 
novel problems. Hatano and Inagaki (1992) theorized about the conditions that 
promote adaptive expertise.  They proposed that underlying an adaptive expert’s skill 
proficiency is a psychological state of cognitive incongruity; the belief that one’s 
current repertoire of skills and knowledge is inadequate or insufficient, thus requiring 
greater learning and inquiry.  Hatano and Inagaki (1992) proposed that cognitive 
incongruity can be triggered when; (1) encountering a novel problem that cannot be 
solved with the knowledge available, or a prediction based on prior knowledge gets 
disconfirmed; (2) engaging in controversial discussion and debate; (3) the desire for 
learning is not motivated by extrinsic rewards; and (4) the surrounding environment 
and culture supports it. 
Bransford and colleagues (2008) proposed that the ease with which a tacit 
schema gets misapplied to solve a novel problem may stem from over-reliance on a 
solution that gets regularly applied to existing, familiar problems.  As situations 
become more routine and certain solutions become accepted, individuals do not see a 
need for using critical inquiry.  Critical inquiry prompts individuals to question their 
assumptions and frame and reframe the way that problem statements are 
understood.  This in turn can influence types of solutions generated (Getzels, 1979).  
According to the critical inquiry model developed by Argyris and Schön (1973), 
having an open-minded perspective to various forms of evidence, as well as having the 
freedom to search and deliberate enables the disruption of existing schemas. A 
mindset of this kind avoids adopting quick solutions based on a limited or superficial 
understanding of a problem statement. Instead, cognitive processes are devoted to a 
deep consideration of underlying conceptual dimensions and root causes.   
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In theory, using a mindset of critical inquiry and developing the cognitive skill 
sets of an adaptive expert corresponds with findings from research found on the 
relationships between distrustful mindsets, cognitive flexibility and creativity.  As 
theorized by Schul and colleagues (2004) a trust mindset facilitates routine forms of 
thinking that direct attention toward maintaining the status quo.  In contrast, a 
distrustful mindset promotes thinking about concepts in more flexible and atypical 
terms.  The diverging effect that trust and distrust have on information processing 
appears to relate to the differences found in the environmental circumstances, learning 
experiences and solutions that routine and adaptive experts seek. By virtue of low 
variability in their environment and implicit trust in using existing knowledge to solve 
new problems, routine experts are less likely to find effective, novel solutions and 
levels of innovative and creative thinking are minimal. In contrast, adaptive experts 
likely utilize a distrustful mindset, which promotes critical inquiry and non-routine 
modes of thinking.  In this mindset, tacit knowledge is more frequently brought to the 
surface, in which individuals are challenged to understand the “how” and “why” of 
their knowledge base. In this way, distrust serves as a psychological state that guides 
active learning processes and promotes an information processing shift for exploring 
more relevant sources of creative solutions.  The following section elaborates on an 
issue of where routine expertise and trust may prove particularly dubious: the 
knowledge transfer process and failure to recognize when prior knowledge is relevant 
to solving a new problem that appears different on the surface but is actually 
structurally identical.   
Surface Similarity and the Knowledge Transfer Problem 
Whitehead (1929) labeled the term “inert knowledge” to describe situations 
where people have learned relevant knowledge and skills yet fail to spontaneously 
access this knowledge despite its relevance for problem solving. Examples include 
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poor transfer of skills and knowledge learned in the classroom to the outside world 
and work settings (Lave, 1988) and failure to retrieve and apply solutions to analogical 
reasoning problems (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 1983).    
Knowledge utilization is often assessed by comparing how well learners 
spontaneously transfer knowledge they possess or have recently acquired to a new 
problem context (Pea, 1987). Utilizing knowledge effectively requires developing a 
problem representation followed by stating and justifying solutions to the problem, 
often referred to in the literature as categorization and knowledge retrieval. When 
categorizing a problem, the problem solver links the problem statement contents to 
known problems or some comprehensive principle (Larkin, McDermott, Simon & 
Simon, 1980). Research has demonstrated that individuals effectively problem-solve 
when they transform or modify prior cases in order make them applicable to new 
problems.  For instance, many transfer researchers have discussed an adaptation or 
“re-representation” phase during transfer, in which one or both of the representations 
involved is altered to make analogical mapping more consistent (e.g., Clement, 1988; 
Gentner & Colhoun, 2010).  Knowledge retrieval is a process of comprehending and 
elaborating on information.  It is thought to be goal-directed and guided by specific 
strategies such as seeking out additional information, examining inferences more 
closely, rebutting counterarguments, generating new inferences, making analogies, 
and developing problem-solving methods like problem decomposition.    
Over the last several decades, the study of knowledge transfer has added to an 
understanding of the conditions under which individuals effectively apply their 
knowledge.   One method that facilitates knowledge transfer is analogical reasoning 
(Gentner, 1983).  Analogical reasoning is a process of recognizing the commonalities 
between a past situation x (source) and current situation y (target).  Upon recognizing 
the similarities between source and target, one cognitively manipulates x to an 
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understanding of y. The success of "analogical mapping" requires: (1) that the thinker 
has a deep and flexible understanding of the source domain that is applicable to the 
target, and, (2) that there is no conversion problem between the conceptual schemes of 
the source and target domains (Pea, 1987). 
The knowledge transfer literature has consistently revealed the strong inﬂuence 
of concrete surface similarities on analogical reasoning. That is, individuals have a 
much easier time mapping structural elements between cases when the surface details 
to cases are the same.  (e.g., Anderson, Farrell, & Sauers, 1984; Ross, 1987; Salomon 
& Perkins, 1989).  Otherwise, when the surface details between cases are different, 
despite sharing underlying information of which is structurally and configurationally 
fit, spontaneous transfer is difficult and unlikely.  This is because attention is strongly 
guided toward finding commonalities among surface characteristics, despite being of 
limited benefit (Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Weisberg, DiCamillo, & Phillips, 
1978).  Thus, surface commonalities often impose a greater influence on knowledge 
transfer and superficially signal shared, analogous content, even when no true, 
structural fit may exist (Gentner, Ratterman, and Forbus, 1993). 
The work of Gick and Holyoak (1980, 1983) demonstrated the robustness of 
recognition failure on analogical knowledge transfer.  Using Duncker’s (1945) classic 
“radiation problem,” participants were told about a patient with an inoperable tumor in 
his stomach. There was a type of ray that could be used to treat the patient, but at 
intensities sufﬁcient to destroy the tumor, too much healthy tissue would also be 
destroyed. At lower intensities, the ray would be harmless to healthy tissue but would 
not affect the tumor. Participants were asked to propose a solution that could destroy 
the tumor while also leaving healthy tissue intact. The solution involves a convergence 
approach, in which several low intensity rays are administered at once, from different 
angles, converging at the site of the tumor, thus creating a greater aggregate and 
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sufficient intensity.  Participants have a very difﬁcult time solving this problem.  What 
is more interesting though is that presenting participants with a case example before 
solving the radiation problem, that differs in cover story yet bears structural similarity 
to the radiation problem, does little to improve performance. Participants have 
generally only been successful at solving the radiation problem when given an explicit 
cue to consider the relevance of a previously learned situation (e.g., “the story you 
read earlier might be relevant in solving this problem”) (Catrambone & Holyoak, 
1989).  
Without such strong hints, however, recognition failure is more often the norm 
than the exception. In one of the more subtle experimental attempts to shift 
participants’ attention to notice structural alignment between cases of information, 
Anolli, Antonietti, Crisafulli, and Cantoia (2001) interrupted participants during their 
attempts to solve Duncker’s radiation problem with a request that they answer a 
relevant question about a previously seen, analogous problem.  After completing the 
prompt, participants were then allowed to continue working on the radiation problem. 
Despite that the prompt should have hinted to individuals to look for commonalities 
between the sources of information, successful transfer was poor (5–10% of the time) 
and did not differ from the results of a control condition in which no analogous prior 
problem had been given.  
In other work, researchers examined the likelihood of knowledge transfer if 
participants were to engage in similar kinds of cognitive processing during the 
learning and testing phases of the study.  For example, in the testing phase of a study 
conducted by Perfetto, Bransford, & Franks (1983) participants were asked to solve 
insight puzzles, (e.g. “A man in the U.S. married 20 different women in the same 
town. All of them are still living and he has never divorced one of them, yet he has 
broken no law. Can you explain?).”  Prior to the testing phase, participants were 
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presented with information that could help them solve the puzzle (e.g., reading the 
sentence “A minister marries several people each week.”).  However, individuals were 
generally unsuccessful at making the link and performance was poor.  The researchers 
then presented the solution that matched how participants were processing the test 
puzzles—such as, “You can marry several people each week ...if you are a minister,” 
and found that participants were much more likely to transfer their knowledge and 
solve the puzzles effectively (Lockhart, Lamon, & Gick, 1988).  
In summary, past research has provided a strong and consistent picture of the 
role of similarity in transfer. While structural similarity serves as the basis for 
meaningful knowledge transfer, surface similarity between situations heavily 
influences whether transfer will actually occur.  Unfortunately, the use of hints and 
cues utilized in much of these studies to improve knowledge transfer has little value 
for problem-solving in the real world.  Thus, more contemporary research has been 
examining online factors, such as psychological states that can spontaneously 
influence information processing and facilitate knowledge transfer more effectively.  
In the following section I discuss several lines of research following this pursuit.    
Mindset and Knowledge Transfer 
A long line of research in the area of self-regulation has demonstrated the 
impact and significance that a psychological mindset can have on behavior.  A 
psychological mindset increases the likelihood of changing behavior in a certain 
direction, due to the way that information is processed and construed.  For example, 
Fujita and colleagues (2006) found that priming participants with high-level construals 
of a situation (abstract, central features of an situation) relative to low level construals 
(detailed, concrete details of a situation) led to decreased preferences for immediate 
over delayed outcomes, greater physical endurance, stronger intentions to exert self- 
control, and less positive evaluations of temptations that undermine self-control.  
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Studies are now emerging examining the effect that such psychological states have on 
encoding information and knowledge transfer.   Recently, Bliznashki & Kokinov 
(2010) found that priming a mindset that tuned participants’ attention toward thinking 
about information in relational terms subsequently led to processing other information 
in similar ways.  For example, after attempting several items from the Raven 
Progressive Matrices test, which involves solving visual analogies based on structural 
relationships between a series of diagrams, participants were more likely to judge the 
similarities between new scenes based on underlying structural matches rather than 
surface matches. 
Another way in which learners may influence their own encoding is in terms of 
the specific goals with which they approach a given task.  Achievement goals, such as 
mastery versus performance goals have been shown to influence learning outcomes 
(Elliot, 1999; Pintrich, 2000). Whereas mastery goals relate to persistence, 
competency and a personalized agenda for long term learning and improvement, 
performance goals relate to short-term goals that demonstrate one’s ability relative to 
others. Recent research has revealed effects of achievement goals on knowledge 
transfer.  For example, Bereby-Meyer, Moran, and Unger-Aviram (2004) put groups 
of participants into either a performance or mastery condition to learn a negotiation 
task.  Some participants were given instructions that emphasized performance goals, 
such as achieving error-free performance, whereas others received instructions that 
emphasized mastery goals of long-term persistence and understanding of content.  An 
examination of performance on similar negotiation tasks revealed that both conditions 
experienced performance improvement.  However, when the negotiation context 
changed, there was no significant difference between the performance-oriented 
condition and the control group, whereas those in the mastery-oriented condition 
reliably improved at the task.  
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Finally, there is evidence that the quantity and quality of explanations 
individuals generate when problem solving influences learning and knowledge 
transfer. The self-explanation effect has beneficial effects on learning and transfer 
because learners make inferences and become aware of the disparities between their 
own mental models and the ones presented by the examples (Chi, 2000).  For example, 
Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser (1989) found that students who generated rich 
descriptions and self-explained a problem statement were more successful at solving 
knowledge transfer problems. Self-explanation strategies included, explaining and 
justifying steps in an example problem, elaborating on conceptual relationships 
between subsequent actions, and consideration of goals and consequences.  Renkl 
(1997) also found positive effects on knowledge transfer from the use of self-
explanation methods and that self-explanation methods have lasting effects within 
individuals across situations.   
Research examining the ways that learners can use a mindset to influence their 
encoding and transfer is in its infancy, despite being of great value. In the following 
section, I discuss how a distrusting mindset may serve as another mechanism for 
influencing knowledge transfer.  Although possessing a trusting mindset is often 
equated to being beneficial for knowledge transfer, (such as, one can rely on using 
what has worked in the past), failure to use knowledge adaptively often happens when 
one only knows how to use their knowledge in familiar situations.  As previously 
discussed, the literature on knowledge transfer has repeatedly shown that individuals 
are poor at transferring their knowledge because they look for similarity in surface 
characteristics between situations rather than underlying, structural similarity.  
However, if individuals were to loosen the contextual constraints of a problem 
statement and zero in on the central components, then the likelihood of finding a 
relevant solution should increase.  It is worthy to ask whether a mindset can attenuate 
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the inert knowledge problem.  Perhaps a trust mindset promotes a search for surface 
familiarity among information sources or elicits a simplified set of mental practices for 
processing information.  For example, Hatano & Inagaki (1986) found that routine 
experts failed to develop adaptive learning skills to create new procedures for solving 
problems and had trouble using their knowledge to solve new problems. In contrast, 
adaptive experts consistently attempted new ways to use and understand their skill.  
Similar issues likely exist for a range of professionals who do their job very well by 
practicing their skill routinely, yet fail to see how they can use their skill under 
different conditions. Perhaps a mindset of distrust impacts the discovery of solutions 
and transfer, through a mechanism by which problem statements get reconstructed as a 
result of considering concepts in more flexible and adaptive terms.   
The ubiquitous nature with which distrust is elicited in everyday life, 
particularly when change is on the horizon, is informative for advancing research in 
the area of knowledge transfer.  Distrust is a state of mind that challenges individuals 
to question themselves before putting their resources into action.  Similar to a mastery 
orientation, individuals in a distrustful mindset are more likely to question whether 
they are truly competent or need to revise how they are thinking about a problem or 
going to use a solution.  In line with the self-explanation effect, individuals in a 
distrustful mindset compared to a trust mindset, are more likely to elaborate about 
what they know and whether they see a discrepancy between information that is given, 
what they understand and what is less understood.  In the next section, I discuss the 
theoretical and empirical work on distrust and present my hypotheses that discuss the 
effect of distrust on the retrieval and transfer of knowledge. 
Distrust, Cognitive Flexibility and Knowledge Transfer: 
Distrust is defined as; (1) doubt of the honesty or reliability of something; (2) 
to regard with suspicion (Oxforddictionaries.com, 2014).  Fein’s definition of 
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suspicious mindsets, suggests that distrust represents a “dynamic state in which an 
individual actively entertains multiple, plausibly rival hypotheses about motives or 
genuineness of information” (1996, p. 1165).   Distrust, similar in meaning to “doubt,” 
“suspicion,” and “skepticism,” is a goal-oriented state where one seeks a validation of 
truth and greater transparency of information.  A distrustful mindset can induce a 
critical reasoning process for interpreting and evaluating information (Halpern, 2003). 
In contrast to mistrust, which implies an interpersonal concern that others are 
deceptive and maliciously attempting to conceal information, distrust is often self-
generated and/or triggered by variability in the environment, taking on a valence-free 
form of truth seeking.   Rather than using a suspicious mindset toward understanding 
the intentions of others, one uses suspicious thinking inwardly, toward the self.  That 
is, a distrustful mindset shifts attention to examine prior knowledge to avoid making 
mistakes and relying on biases that are often routinely accepted (Schul, Mayo, & 
Burnstein, 2004). 
The meta-cognitive processes involved with examining prior knowledge and 
taking a learning stance toward self-knowledge mirrors views related to scientific 
inquiry.  For example, Dewey (1933) regarded the value of using scientific inquiry and 
distrust in one’s knowledge as an opportunity to (re)construct knowledge and to 
encourage an examination of information in relation to one’s individualistic set of 
experiences and perspectives. According to Dewey, thinking critically requires making 
sense of things through questioning, debate, and reflection, particularly, on issues and 
concepts that have been accepted or assumed to be true based on common beliefs and 
explanations. 
A number of scholars have argued that the human cognitive system has 
adapted to the psychological mindset of distrust by influencing information processing 
differently than a feeling of trust (Schul, Mayo & Burnstein, 2004; Cosmides & Toby, 
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2005).  Individuals in a mindset of distrust sense that things may not be as they appear 
and that change or unpredictability is on the horizon (Kramer, 1999).  Schul and 
colleagues argue that the feeling of distrust “is not the kind associated with outcomes 
that are inherently probabilistic, as in playing a slot machine or roulette. Rather, 
distrust reflects the receiver’s theory about the truth” (Schul, Mayo, Burnstein, & 
Yahalom, 2007).  When a state of trust is active, one accepts and believes in the 
available information.  In contrast, when a state of distrust is active, one senses that 
the truth is being concealed and requires a search for non-routine or non-obvious 
alternative interpretations of the given information (Fein, 1996; Schul, Burnstein, & 
Bardi, 1996).  
According to Schul and colleagues (2004) information processing follows a 
more adaptive strategy under conditions of distrust.  Under a state of trust, information 
is processed as if it is true, bringing to mind ‘routine’ and prototypical concepts for 
how to think and behave.  However, a state of distrust will spontaneously bring to 
mind a prototypical account of how to think and behave in accordance with routine 
and normative standards, yet also simultaneously prompt a counter or less typical view 
of the prototypical way to think and behave, thus preparing for the possibility that 
taking a perspective that is different and non-routine may be useful.  The utility of 
processing information in non-prototypical and non-routine ways is that it stimulates 
individuals to question how they are interpreting the contextual framework of an 
information source.  This may be particularly conducive for knowledge transfer due to 
the need for focusing on configurational details between sources of information, rather 
than on surface features for an effective mapping.  
In an examination of the adaptive effects of distrust, Schul et. al., (2004) 
studied the associative links that became activated when participants processed 
information under a trusting versus distrusting stimulus.  Schul et. al., (2004) found 
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that a prime word appearing under a stimulus of distrust triggered associations that 
were opposite the meaning of the target word (e.g., dark activated light). Conversely, a 
prime word appearing under a stimulus of trust triggered associations that were 
congruent (e.g., dark activated night).  This work reinforced the notion that states of 
trust (versus distrust) differentially influence information processing and the 
generation of inferences (Cosmides & Toby, 2005).  Further, this research set the 
foundation for examining the effect of distrust on using information more flexibly.  If 
one is in a distrusting mindset, one is likely to probe more and also consider what 
might happen if the opposite is true and consider potential counter-scenarios. 
Counterfactual thinking, for example, has been shown to foster creativity (Markman, 
Lindberg, Kray, & Galinsky, 2007) and to be helpful in overcoming functional 
fixedness (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) and set breaking, which are indicators of 
cognitive flexibility.  Studies that have examined the counterfactual thinking effect, 
which mirrors the mindset of a state of distrust, have found that counterfactual 
thinking activates and increases cognitive flexibility such that individuals are less 
likely to show a confirmation bias and more likely to test the reverse direction of a 
given hypothesis, as well as come up with new uses of an object (Galinsky and 
Moskowitz, 2000).  
Other research has demonstrated that a state of distrust inclines people to go 
beyond merely thinking about information to be true or untrue, but to consider how 
contextual information that frames central pieces of information may be misleading or 
irrelevant (Hilton et al., 1993). Individuals elaborate more when distrustful but also 
generate multiple interpretations of information to have a broader and more inclusive 
understanding of it (Hilton et al., 1993; Schul et al., 1996).  The capacity to think 
about information in general and broader terms permits a more flexible interpretation 
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of problem statements and eases the process for retrieving relevant solutions and 
transferring knowledge (Clement, Mawby, &Giles, 1994). 
More recently, studies have shown that distrust improves cognitive flexibility, 
which in turn enables creativity.  For example, Mayer and Mussweiler (2011) 
demonstrated that participants in a distrustful mindset judged atypical exemplars of 
particular categories to be more inclusive of their category families, than individuals 
not in a distrustful mindset.  In one study, Mayer and Mussweiler (2011) tested the 
effect of distrust on performance on a category inclusion task, as a measure of 
cognitive flexibility (Isen & Daubman, 1984; Rosch, 1975).  A category inclusion task 
involves asking participants to rate the goodness of fit of several exemplars (e.g., 
chair, stool, telephone) to a superordinate category (e.g., furniture). Identifying highly 
and moderately typical exemplars (e.g., chair, stool) as good representatives of their 
category is not presumed to require cognitive flexibility (Isen & Daubman, 1984), 
because these exemplars are highly prototypical of the category. The extent to which 
atypical exemplars (e.g., telephone) are included in the category, however, requires 
having a looser and more open interpretation and, therefore, depends on having 
cognitive flexibility. Mayer and Mussweiler (2011), found that participants in a 
distrustful mindset gave higher typicality ratings to atypical exemplars, relative to 
participants primed by a trust mindset or in a neutral group.  Thus, distrust enabled 
cognitive flexibility, which in turn influenced the ratings of atypical exemplars as 
being seen as inclusive to the superordinate category.  Participants in the distrust 
mindset group were also faster at identifying atypical exemplars, relative to 
participants primed by a trust mindset and a neutral group.  This work indicates that 
distrust facilitates a flexible mindset which enables individuals to think in more 
abstract ways.   The capacity to re-represent information is important when problem 
solving because innovative solutions are often not readily obvious or visible.  Rather, 
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individuals need to reconfigure and reconstruct information to more easily retrieve and 
generate effective solutions.  
In contemporary times it has become ever more pressing to find interventions 
that promote learning and innovation in the face of organizational shift and change.  
Former Intel CEO Andrew Grove championed the idea of using a “paranoid” mindset 
to facilitate finding abstract solutions to conventional issues that depart from using 
common strategies that the competition may consider.  For example, Grove’s strategic 
plans for becoming a supplier of microprocessors was a function of comparing Intel’s 
situation with the steel industry and Nucor’s decision to operate its own steel mill to 
make steel products.  Grove’s skepticism of treating Intel’s problems as a set of 
computer or electronic issues, led him to consider Intel’s situation in a broader sense 
and look to an existing industry that achieved success experiencing similar threats and 
opportunities as Intel. As a result of rejecting the normative way of examining the 
problem, Grove considered Intel’s situation on a more abstract level and considered 
the underlying strategy commonalities found between the steel and microprocessor 
industries.  Steel and microprocessors are unrelated products, yet Intel could enter and 
grow the microprocessor industry as Nucor did with the steel industry.  In an effort to 
design an innovative solution, Grove turned away from following what the 
competition was doing. His approach was radical, yet successful because he found 
insight from aligning the structural relationships found between two industries, rather 
than through product features.  
Individuals with a distrustful mindset not only seek out multiple perspectives 
to reason with but they also reason about information more flexibly and deeply, thus 
finding structural and relational representations more compelling and meaningful.  A 
distrusting mindset is one that probes more and considers what might happen if the 
opposite is true and consider potential counter-scenarios. Therefore, whereas in many 
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cases, routine forms of thinking predispose individuals to focus on irrelevant, surface 
features, in contrast distrust sensitizes attention toward noticing underlying relational 
similarities.  Accordingly, I predict that distrust should help individuals bypass 
superficial features of a problem statement and extract relevant, relational properties. 
Hypothesis 1: Participants in a distrustful mindset, relative to a neutral or 
trust mindset, will more accurately solve a problem, using knowledge transfer 
from a previously learned case that differs in cover story, but is 
configurationally relevant. 
Hypothesis 2:  Participants in a distrustful mindset, relative to a neutral 
mindset, will more accurately solve a problem, transferring knowledge from a 
distant but configurationally relevant analog case, versus a superficially 
similar, but non-analogous case. 
Finally, the difficulty of transfer has been interpreted in terms of a dissociation 
between the kinds of similarity that governs access to long-term memory and the 
similarity that is used in evaluating and reasoning from a present analogical match 
(Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbus, 1993; Ross, 1989).   The inert knowledge problem as 
mentioned earlier occurs when individuals fail to retrieve and apply knowledge from 
prior learning episodes to new situations.  In this final study, I examine whether 
distrust facilitates retrieval of knowledge on tests of “far” transfer. This argument rests 
on the idea that because distrust improves abstract thinking and aids in the re-
representation of information, individuals can better retrieve and match “source” and 
“target” concepts that in turn lead to analogical mapping and knowledge transfer.  
Distrust may be particularly helpful in maximizing the likelihood of retrieving 
analogous problems on tests of far transfer for several reasons.  First, a distrusting 
mindset may encourage people to focus on the causal and relational aspects of the 
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problem statement rather than the superficial contextual elements of the 
problem.   This is because a distrust mindset facilitates reasoning about information 
more deeply and comprehensively, where structural and relational representations are 
found to be compelling and meaningful.   A state of distrust also influences 
information processing where information is encoded in more flexible and abstract, 
relational terms, which will facilitate retrieval access to relevant stored prior 
knowledge that share underlying similarities to a new problem statement.   
Hypothesis 3: Participants in a distrustful mindset, relative to a neutral 
mindset, will more accurately solve a “far” transfer analogous problem case 
that takes place 4 days after encoding three mutually aligned analog cases. 
In summary, prior work has demonstrated that a distrustful mindset is one that 
facilitates flexibility and non-routine cognition.  The ability to break away from using 
prior approaches and conventional methods for solving novel problems is critical.  
However, even experts often fail to realize when a situation calls for a novel versus 
familiar solution to a problem.  This issue highlights the key difference found between 
a routine expert and an adaptive expert.  Adaptive experts will question their 
knowledge more frequently and attempt to use their knowledge in more flexible ways, 
to find relevant and novel solution interventions.  As discussed with the inert 
knowledge problem, individuals must recognize when and where a solution is valid.  
This can often be very challenging because it requires ignoring surface details and 
instead uncovering a structural match between what may seem like very distant and 
unrelated domains of information.  Most individuals however are inclined to find 
matches on the surface of information instead of its structural properties and often 
bypass information that seems unrelated on the surface.   A mindset of distrust is 
beneficial in these areas because it disposes individuals to use their knowledge in 
different and non-routine ways.  It improves the capacity to think abstractly and 
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enables flexibility in processing information, reconfiguring concepts and overcoming 
contextual barriers to make retrieval, analogical mapping and knowledge transfer more 
likely.  
Distrust may serve as a critical “processing influence” on problem solving.   
Despite that it has yet to be studied it nonetheless has great potential for adding to our 
understanding.  In particular, (a) distrust may serve a role in enhancing critical inquiry 
and using knowledge in more flexible ways to restructure concepts, increase retrieval 
of prior knowledge, and enhance analogical mapping (H1), (b) distrust may promote 
knowledge transfer by encouraging a stronger focus to structural properties as opposed 
to superficial details (H2), and (c) distrust promotes knowledge transfer by 
reconfiguring information found in “source” and “target” matches,  increasing 
retrieval of prior knowledge, and in turn making “far transfer” applications of 
knowledge more likely (H3).  I examine these arguments in three different studies of 
knowledge transfer, using tests of analogical problem solving. 
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Chapter 2 
EXAMINING THE EFFECT OF DISTRUST ON KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER 
STUDY 1 
Study 1 was designed to investigate how implicit impressions of distrust affect a 
participant’s capacity to solve an analogical transfer problem (see Appendix A-E for 
problem sets).  I predicted that participants in a distrustful mindset, relative to a 
neutral or trust mindset, would more accurately solve an analog problem case, when 
provided with an initial solved analog case. 
METHOD 
Participants and Design 
Participants were individuals from the United States who volunteered through a paid 
advertisement on Amazon Mechanical Turk (48% males, mean age of 29 years).  The 
experiment had a 3 (distrust, trust, control mindset) x 1 (analogy problem) mixed 
design.  Participants were paid $1.50 for their participation. 
Experimental procedure 
Upon giving study consent, participants were told that they would answer questions 
related to stories that they would be reading.  Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of three priming conditions: distrust, trust, or neutral.  Priming research is 
concerned with temporarily activating the internal mental states that mediate 
psychological processes (how people think, feel, behave differently than otherwise) in 
a passive and hidden manner (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).  This type of research 
focuses on the activating social knowledge structures without participants being aware 
of or attending to such influences (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).   
I manipulated distrust in a pure fashion (“mere state of distrust”; Schul et al., 2004, p. 
669) that does not simultaneously involve additional social factors, such as, for 
example, decreased liking of a specific target.  I also choose to manipulate distrust in a 
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subtle way because of the assumption that distrust is often automatically and implicitly 
prompted by external forces and is often outside peoples’ awareness that they are 
using a distrusting mindset when processing information (Schul et al., 2004, 2007).  
To prime the distrust mindset outside of participants’ awareness, I used a scrambled 
sentences task.  The scrambled sentences task is a common priming procedure that 
gets widely used for concept activation in an unobtrusive manner (Bargh & Chartrand, 
2000).  Generally, priming stimuli in a scrambled sentences task are selected by 
consulting a thesaurus for close synonyms of the intended priming concept (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000).   I used a pre-existing scrambled sentences task adapted from a past 
study that investigated the concepts of distrust, trust, and neutral on psychological 
behavior (conducted by Friesen & Sinclair, 2011) across all three studies.    
Instructions to the scrambled sentences priming task explicitly stated that, in each trial, 
five words would be presented in random order. Four out of the five words could form 
a meaningful sentence. Participants were asked to quickly form the correct sentence 
and to type it into the computer. Fifteen out of a total of 30 trials were identical for all 
three conditions. These trials did not contain prime words and were chosen to be 
unrelated to distrust and trust. In the control condition, the same was true for the 
remaining fifteen trials. In the distrust and the trust conditions, the remaining trials 
contained prime words closely related to distrust and trust, respectively.  Appendix F 
shows examples of words that participants were primed with when performing the 
descrambling word exercise.  Appendix G shows examples of the word fragments 
related to distrust that participants completed as a mindset priming manipulation 
check.  
Dependent measure: 
Next, participants read a source case analog that contained the convergence principle 
solution embedded in its text (adapted from Gick and Holyoak, 1983). The source 
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analog was The General (see Appendix A). To ensure encoding, participants were 
instructed to generate the critical insight to The General. The target problem used at 
test was the Radiation problem developed by Duncker (1945) (see Appendix B).   At 
test, participants attempted the Radiation problem.  At the conclusion of the study, a 
manipulation check of the priming procedure assessed whether participants were 
aware of the primes.  
Manipulation check: 
Differences in the completion of the word stems associated with distrust were counted 
and analyzed for significance among the mindset priming techniques, using GLM 
binary logistic regression.  Diagnostic tests of the residuals revealed a normal 
distribution.  A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the 
distrust mindset accessibility measure for distrust, neutral and trust mindset 
conditions. There was a significant effect of mindset on completion of the word stems 
having to do with words related to distrust at the p<.05 level for the three conditions 
[F (2, 179) = 6.40, p = 0.001]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test 
indicated that the mean score for the distrust condition (M = 2.88, SD = .82) was 
significantly different than the trust condition (M = 2.24, SD = 1.03) and the neutral 
condition (M = 2.48, SD = 1.00).  However, the neutral condition and trust condition 
did not significantly differ from each other. Taken together, these results suggest that 
the distrust prime successfully activated the concept of distrust.  Appendix G shows 
examples of the word fragments related to distrust that participants completed as a 
mindset priming manipulation check. 
Scoring.  
Two raters blind to condition scored whether each response solved the Radiation 
problem in terms of the convergence solution and discussed borderline cases with 
another rater to produce an agreed-upon scoring.  The level of inter-rater agreement 
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was 98%. When more than one solution was written, participants were credited with 
the correct answer if it was among the proposed solutions. As in previous research 
using the convergence materials, a response was scored as a convergence solution if it 
captured the principle of a multiplicity of low-intensity rays acting in concert on the 
tumor. Solutions involving repetition over time rather than in parallel were not 
counted as convergence solutions. Responses such as “use a lot of low-intensity 
rays”—for which the application of rays at the same time and to the same area is only 
implied—were accepted (rejecting them produced a small overall reduction in solution 
rates that was evenly balanced across conditions). 
RESULTS: 
A chi-square test was performed and no relationship was found between distrust, trust, 
and a neutral mindset on analogical problem solving, 𝑥2 (2, N = 89) = .088, p =.957. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 showed that individuals who experienced a subtle priming of 
distrust, trust, or a neutral mindset did not differ in their capacity to solve an analogous 
case.  Although, the priming manipulation check indicated that the manipulation 
technique had been effective in putting individuals into a particular mindset, one 
reason participants may not have benefited from being in a distrustful mindset was 
because they had not encoded knowledge from the initial case well enough.  
Therefore, in Study 2, participants were given two analog cases, before attempting to 
solve the Radiation problem.  Additionally, it was of value to see if participants could 
detect that the inclusion of a case (with surface similarity to the Radiation case) would 
be irrelevant and ineffective to solving the Radiation problem.   
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Chapter 3 
EXAMINING THE EFFECT OF DISTRUST ON IRRELEVANT INFORMATION 
AND KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER 
STUDY 2 
Study 2 was designed to investigate how implicit impressions of distrust affect a 
participant’s capacity to solve an analogical transfer problem (see Appendix A-F for 
problem sets).  I predicted that participants in a distrustful mindset relative to a neutral 
mindset, would more accurately solve an analogous problem case. Participants were 
provided with the General case, as well as an additional solved analog case and a third 
case bearing superficial similarity to the Radiation problem, though not structurally 
similar. 
METHOD 
Participants and Design 
Participants were individuals from the United States who volunteered through a paid 
advertisement on Amazon Mechanical Turk (46% males, mean age of 31 years).  The 
experiment had a 2 (distrust, neutral mindset) x 1 (analogy problem) mixed design.  
Participants were paid $1.50 for their participation. 
Experimental procedure 
Upon giving study consent, participants were told that they would answer questions 
related to stories that they would be reading.  Next, participants read the source analog 
case The General (see Appendix A).  As in study 1, participants were instructed to 
generate the critical insight to The General, to ensure encoding of the convergence 
principle.  Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of two priming 
conditions: distrust or neutral mindset.  The same scrambled sentencing task was used 
from study 1 to prime participants’ mindsets into either of these states. 
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Next, participants read two cases with solutions provided at the end of each case.  
Participants read Mount Sinai (see Appendix C), a case with superficial similarity to 
the Radiation problem, in that it was related to the medical domain, yet was non-
analogous to the Radiation problem because it did not contain a convergence principle 
solution.  The other case, titled Red Adair (see Appendix D)(Gick and Holyoak, 1983), 
utilized the convergence principle in its problem solution.  These cases were presented 
in counter-balanced order.  Participants were given the option to write notes about the 
cases. 
Dependent measure:  
The target problem used at test was the Radiation problem (see Appendix B) 
(Duncker, 1945). At the conclusion of the study, a manipulation check of the priming 
procedure assessed whether participants were aware of the primes.  
Manipulation check: 
Differences in the completion of the word stems associated with distrust were counted 
and analyzed for significance among the mindset priming techniques, using GLM 
binary logistic regression.  Diagnostic tests of the residuals revealed a normal 
distribution.  Regarding the distrust mindset accessibility measure, distrust-prime 
participants (M=3.19, SD =1.60) completed the word stems with more words having 
to do with distrust than neutral-prime participants (M=2.59, SD=1.04), t (124) =2.40, p 
=.018, suggesting that the distrust prime successfully activated the concept of distrust.  
Scoring  
Two raters blind to condition scored whether each response solved the Radiation 
problem in terms of the convergence solution and discussed borderline cases with 
another rater to produce an agreed-upon scoring.  The level of inter-rater agreement 
was 97%.  
RESULTS 
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A chi-square test was performed and no relationship was found between distrust and a 
neutral mindset on analogical problem solving, 𝑥2 (1, N = 51) = .013, p =.910. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 2 showed that individuals who experienced a subtle priming of 
distrust or a neutral mindset did not differ on their capacity to solve an analogous case.  
Also, neither group borrowed information from the Mount Sinai case, suggesting that 
participants had some indication that it was of little help to solving the Radiation 
problem.  Though, the manipulation check indicated that priming technique had been 
effective in putting individuals into a particular mindset, one reason participants may 
not have benefited from being in a distrustful mindset was because they had still not 
encoded knowledge from the initial case well enough.  Therefore, in Study 3, 
participants were given three analog cases, before attempting to solve the Radiation 
problem, 4 days later.   
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Chapter 4 
EXAMINING THE EFFECT OF DISTRUST ON FAR KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER 
STUDY 3 
Study 3 was designed to investigate how implicit impressions of distrust affect a 
participant’s capacity to solve an analogical transfer problem in a test of far transfer 
(see Appendix A-D for problem sets).  I predicted that participants in a distrustful 
mindset, relative to a neutral mindset, would more accurately solve an analog problem 
case, when provided with three initial solved analog cases. 
METHOD 
Participants and Design 
Participants were individuals from the United States who volunteered through a paid 
advertisement on Amazon Mechanical Turk (51% males, mean age of 28 years).  The 
experiment had a 2 (distrust, neutral mindset) x 1 (analogy problem) mixed design.  
Participants were paid $1.50 for their participation. 
Experimental procedure 
Upon giving study consent, participants were told that they would answer questions 
related to stories that they would be reading.  Next, participants read three analog 
cases The General, Red Adair and The Aquarium, (Gick & Holyoak,1983; see 
Appendix A,D,E).  The General and Red Adair utilized the convergence principle 
solution, which was embedded in each case. Participants were instructed to generate 
the critical insight to The General and Red Adair.  Additionally, after reading the third 
case, The Aquarium, participants were told that the solution to this problem utilized 
the same solution principle found in The General and Red Adair. Thus, participants 
were asked to generate a solution to The Aquarium using the critical insight found in 
the other cases, to ensure encoding of the convergence principle.  Four days later, 
participants were sent an email link to complete the study.  Participants were randomly 
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assigned to one of two priming conditions: distrust or neutral mindset.  The same 
scrambled sentencing task was used from study 1 to prime participants’ mindsets into 
either of these states. 
Dependent measure  
The target problem used at test was the Radiation problem (Duncker, 1945). At the 
conclusion of the study, a manipulation check of the priming procedure assessed 
whether participants were aware of the primes.  
Manipulation check 
Differences in the completion of the word stems associated with distrust were counted 
and analyzed for significance among the mindset priming techniques, using GLM 
binary logistic regression.  Diagnostic tests of the residuals revealed a normal 
distribution.  Regarding the distrust mindset accessibility measure, distrust-prime 
participants (M=3.38, SD =1.45) completed the word stems with more words having 
to do with distrust than neutral-prime participants (M=2.59, SD=1.04), t (136) =3.47, p 
=.001, suggesting that the distrust prime successfully activated the concept of distrust. 
Scoring  
Two raters blind to condition scored whether each response solved the Radiation 
problem in terms of the convergence solution and discussed borderline cases with 
another rater to produce an agreed-upon scoring.  The level of inter-rater agreement 
was 98%.  
RESULTS 
A chi-square test was performed and no relationship was found between distrust and a 
neutral mindset on analogical problem solving, 𝑥2 (1, N = 52) = 1.56, p =.211. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 3 showed that individuals who experienced a subtle priming of a 
distrust or neutral mindset did not differ on their capacity to solve an analogous case.  
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Though, the manipulation check indicated that priming technique had been effective in 
putting individuals into a particular mindset, it is possible that the priming technique 
was not strong enough to bring about the desired effects of distrust in participants.  A 
discussion about theoretical and methodological issues is presented in greater detail in 
the General Discussion section. 
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Chapter 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Competition in a global marketplace, technological advances, changing 
demographics, and the speed of information transfer are just some of the influences 
that make “change inevitable.” Uncertainty about the future can naturally press leaders 
to reconsider their organization’s strategic agenda and influence decisions on pivotal 
issues.  In recent times, it has been argued that uncertainty possesses an upside; it can 
increase innovation through the psychological mindsets of distrust and doubt (Teece, 
2007; Kramer, 2002; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998).  Distrust can been argued to 
be an important mediating factor in the uncertainty-innovation relationship because it 
shifts attention and heightens awareness of existing assumptions.  Yet, because there is 
an inherent level of discomfort associated with uncertainty, it is often assumed that 
distrust in existing processes is a negative state of mind.  The purpose of this research 
was to test whether a mindset of distrust has negative or positive influences on using 
knowledge adaptively.   
In recent times, more attention in the management and educational psychology 
literature has been devoted to understanding how and why creative potential is not 
being achieved despite the pressing need for innovative thinking and the capacity to 
transfer knowledge more adaptively.  Scholars have argued that creativity and the 
capacity to think adaptively does not thrive, unless variability and cognitive 
incongruity is introduced (Hatano & Inagaki, 1992).  It has been recommended that 
experts should continuously try new applications of their knowledge and question the 
tacit underpinnings of their knowledge, to engage the creative process.  More recent 
research has demonstrated that distrust serves as a processing influence that enables 
individuals to think more flexibly and creatively (Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011).  Other 
research has found a positive link between abstract thinking and knowledge transfer 
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(Day & Goldstone, 2012).  The goal of the current research was to investigate whether 
distrust effects the capacity of individuals to process information in more flexible 
ways, leading to an increased use of knowledge transfer.   
In the three studies presented here I did not find support for my hypotheses.  
While the manipulation checks appeared to reflect that the priming technique had 
induced the intended mindsets of interest, the level of knowledge transfer that took 
place across between the treatment and control conditions was essentially equivalent 
across the studies.    
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The results to these studies do not support the idea that distrust improves 
knowledge transfer.  Recent research in psychology has examined distrust on 
measures of creativity, abstract thinking, and judgment.  The current work leveraged 
previous findings that distrust has on cognitive flexibility and incorporated analogical 
problem solving as the primary test of knowledge transfer because this form of 
problem solving requires a flexible mindset to re-represent and map conceptual 
properties found between “source” and “target” components.  It was anticipated that 
distrust would facilitate an information processing advantage in which information 
would be interpreted and applied in more flexible ways, leading to a more effective 
mapping process.   
It is possible that the relationship between distrust and knowledge transfer did 
not reveal itself in the current set of studies for a number of methodical reasons.  First, 
the tests to these studies were carried out online using Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
rather than taking place in a physical laboratory space where the experimenter could 
visually monitor the behavior of the participants.  While Amazon Mechanical Turk is 
becoming a popular tool for collecting data, it is valuable to replicate studies 
conducted on Mechanical Turk using the traditional laboratory method as well, as one 
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cannot always be confident that participants will complete experimental procedures as 
they would in a laboratory setting (such as, without distractions or self-generated 
interruptions, which could influence the results to the study). Secondly, the current set 
of studies used a single type of priming procedure despite that there could be other 
ways to prime distrust in participants (Mussweiler & Mayer, 2011).  It is not possible 
to know whether the procedure used in the current studies developed a sense of 
distrust in participants as saliently or powerfully as it potentially could.  For example, 
having participants experience an act of distrust prior to completing the transfer task 
may bring out a more powerful influence on their cognition, which subsequently 
would reveal itself during test trials.  In the future, it would be valuable to develop 
other priming methods of distrust to get at this issue and examine how different levels 
of distrust may have different effects on cognition.  Third, it became apparent by study 
3 that participants benefited by learning of the convergence principle through multiple 
examples.  Therefore, the transfer task may have been challenging for participants 
because the convergence principle was still somewhat novel to them.  Other work has 
demonstrated the importance of schema richness on analogical transfer and that 
gaining expertise of a concept helps individuals considerably improve their 
performance on knowledge transfer tasks, where contextual details have changed 
(Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989).  Therefore, in future work, it is of value to examine 
the effect of distrust on a group of participants who share a baseline level of expertise 
with a task or skill.  This will remove the complication of learning error and permit a 
stable foundation in which it will be easier to assess the effect that distrust has on 
transfer.  
If the relationship between distrust and transfer is re-retested with some of 
these methodological considerations, perhaps the results will show transfer to be 
enhanced.  Alternatively, another account for why distrust may benefit knowledge 
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transfer may exist with its propensity to drive information seeking.  The need to 
validate and seek truth brings motivational and cognitive benefits that perpetuates 
learning.  Krikelas’ (1983) model on information seeking proposes that ‘‘information 
seeking begins when someone perceives that the current state of knowledge is less 
than that needed to deal with some issue (or problem). The process ends when that 
perception no longer exists.’’  This statement resonates with theorizing argued by 
Hatano and Inagaki (1992) that adaptive learning originates with a psychological state 
of cognitive incongruity, which is the belief that one’s current understanding and 
knowledge of a skill is inadequate or insufficient, thus motivating greater information 
seeking.   
It is not far-fetched to see that the need for information seeking should either 
influence or follow from a distrustful mindset, in which individuals pursue an active 
learning attitude to fulfill their goals.   Past research indicates that transfer is enhanced 
when learners are actively involved in the learning process. For example, learning and 
transfer improves when learners compare sources of information (Kourilsky & 
Wittrock, 1987), when they actively generate solutions to a problem, (Needham & 
Begg, 1991), and when they engage in self-explanation (Ahn, Brewer, & Mooney, 
1992). Research indicates that when learners use meta-cognitive strategies, such as 
organization, integration, and linking information to prior knowledge, transfer 
improves (Mayer, 1987).  There appears to be a theoretical connection between 
distrust and active learning and the use of cognitive and motivational strategies toward 
the achievement of knowledge transfer.  The present set of studies did not capture 
these variables of interest, though it seems relevant that strategies of this sort would 
mediate the learning processes taking place between distrust and knowledge transfer.  
In line with these considerations, developing the current theoretical framework to 
further specify mediating and moderating variables that strengthen the relationship 
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between distrust and knowledge transfer will prove valuable.  For example, prior 
research has found the variable of timing to moderate important outcomes in stages of 
learning and creativity.  It may be critical to develop a high enough level of expertise 
before a mindset of distrust is engaged. 
Additionally, although I intended my manipulation technique of distrust to 
trigger an automatic mechanism for reconstructing knowledge, in reality it may not 
work so neatly.  A mindset of distrust may naturally make information more flexible, 
yet the capacity to reconstruct information and organize it effectively for transfer may 
require additional skill.  It is not clear whether people have a disposition for using 
distrust to problem-solve (trait position) or whether a distrustful mindset is developed 
as a skill or learned practice.  This has implications for theorizing about distrust with 
regard to the variety of opinions and debates in different fields that exist on how and 
why people use knowledge more effectively in some situations than in others and why 
some people seem better at using their knowledge more adaptively than others.  For 
example, much of the literature in educational psychology would liken distrust to 
critical thinking, which is a learned skill and used specifically for evaluating 
information.  The argument of this camp is that any person is capable of using distrust 
to their benefit, however, because distrust is a skill, it requires practice and a set of 
strategies for its use. In contrast, scholars in applied psychology tend to take a trait 
perspective, and regard adaptive thinkers as individuals who likely have superior 
working memory skills and thus have an innate ability to manipulate information.  
According to this view, only certain people will ever be good at using distrust to their 
advantage.   
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The propensity for distrust to influence learning and creativity has important 
implications for organizations.  The stress of shift and change in organizations often 
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conjures up thoughts of doubt and uncertainty for employees.  The threat of not 
knowing whether one’s skills and abilities will still be relevant when changes go into 
effect, leaves employees questioning and reflecting on how they can use their skills 
more adaptively and successfully when existing organizational processes, jobs, and 
personnel change.  To date, the most common response to employees who experience 
feelings of doubt when change is taking place is to ignore them.  Leaders tend to focus 
on communicating the changes that will be taking place, which is a good thing, but 
overlook the psychological effect and reactions that change is having on employees. 
However, if a mindset of distrust is influencing employees to adapt their skills and 
facilitating serious consideration toward understanding how to use knowledge in 
different ways, such as, how one might do their job better when change takes place, 
then perhaps distrust is a valuable psychological state that prompts learning and 
development.  Perhaps, management would benefit by investigating how distrust 
influences employee performance, not only from a motivational standpoint, but also 
from a cognitive, knowledge assessment perspective. 
In addition to examining the effect of distrust on knowledge transfer at the 
individual level of analysis, future work should examine how distrust can be 
constructively developed and facilitated at the group and organizational level 
(Lewicki, et. al., 1998). In particular, it is relevant to understand the role that leaders 
play in managing impressions of distrust in group members and the effect this has on 
the type of knowledge that is exchanged.   For example, although a mindset of distrust 
often connotes negativity in the academic literature, historically, organizations have 
been shown to develop a propensity for survival and innovation through cultures and 
learning climates founded on openness to change. 
On a related note, much of past research on creativity has revealed that 
creativity is a risk-taking endeavor (Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011), which suggests that 
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individuals who possess distrusting mindsets may be less likely to speak up about their 
ideas because there could exist a penalty for deviating from “routine” ways of doing 
things.  Therefore, leadership may largely play a role in creating a trusting 
environment, so that the context is a safe one for engaging in distrustful thinking.  It is 
of value to know the leader strategies and tactics and/or leader behaviors and styles 
that encourage and promote the benefits of distrust in the work environment.   
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APPENDIX A 
The General: 
Instructions: Please read the following story carefully.  Make sure you are familiar 
enough with it so that you could retell it in your own words.  You may use the space 
below to summarize key points. 
   
A small country was ruled from a strong fortress by a dictator. The fortress was 
situated in the middle of the country, surrounded by farms and villages. Many roads 
led to the fortress through the countryside. A rebel general vowed to capture the 
fortress. The general knew that an attack by his entire army would capture the fortress.  
He gathered his army at the head of one of the roads, ready to launch a full-scale direct 
attack. However, the general then learned that the dictator had planted mines on each 
of the roads. The mines were set so that small bodies of men could pass over them 
safely, since the dictator needed to move his own troops and workers to and from the 
fortress. However, any large force would detonate the mines. Not only would this 
blow up the road, but it would also destroy many neighboring villages. It seemed 
impossible to capture the fortress.  However, the general devised a simple plan. He 
divided his army into small groups and dispatched each group to the head of a 
different road. When all was ready, he gave the signal and each group marched down a 
different road. Each group continued down its road to the fortress, so that the entire 
army arrived together at the fortress at the same time. In this way, the general captured 
the fortress and overthrew the dictator. 
What critical insight allowed the problem in the story to be solved? 
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APPENDIX B 
Radiation Problem: 
Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient who has a malignant tumor in his 
stomach. To operate on the patient is impossible, but unless the tumor is destroyed, the 
patient will die. A kind of ray, at a sufficiently high intensity, can destroy the tumor. 
Unfortunately, at this intensity the healthy tissue that the rays pass through on the way 
to the tumor will also be destroyed. At lower intensities the rays are harmless to 
healthy tissue, but will not affect the tumor. How can the rays be used to destroy the 
tumor without injuring the healthy tissue? 
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APPENDIX C 
Mount Sinai: 
Instructions: Please read the following story carefully.  Make sure you are familiar 
enough with it so that you could retell it in your own words.  You may use the space 
below to summarize key points. 
 
The Mount Sinai Medical clinic is well known for helping patients who suffer from 
trauma injuries.  In fact, many of today’s trauma saving techniques were invented by 
physicians of the clinic.  For example, the clinic performed one of the first treatment 
cases of thermal trauma, where intravenous fluids were given to a person who had an 
inadequate flow of blood to tissue. This practice has been beneficial in cases of 
isolated trauma or head injuries. They also found that if blood products are needed, a 
greater use of fresh frozen plasma and platelets to packed red blood cells can result in 
improved survival.  The success of platelets has been attributed to the fact that they 
can prevent blood clotting disorder from developing.  This is just one example of why 
Mount Sinai continues to annually win medical practice awards and receive substantial 
amounts of donations every year for improving the survival rates of trauma victims. 
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APPENDIX D 
Red Adair: 
Instructions: Please read the following story carefully.  Make sure you are familiar 
enough with it so that you could retell it in your own words.  You may use the space 
below to summarize key points. 
 
An oil well in Saudi Arabia exploded and caught fire. The result was a blazing inferno 
that consumed an enormous quantity of oil each day. After initial efforts to extinguish 
it failed, famed firefighter Red Adair was called in. Red knew that the fire could be 
put out if a huge amount of fire retardant foam could be dumped on the base of the 
well. There was enough foam available at the site to do the job. However, there was no 
hose large enough to put all the foam on the fire fast enough. The small hoses that 
were available could not shoot the foam quickly enough to do any good.  Red Adair 
knew just what to do. He stationed men in a circle all around the fire, with all of the 
available small hoses. When everyone was ready, all the hoses were opened up and the 
foam was directed at the fire from all directions. In this way a huge amount of foam 
quickly struck the source of the fire. The blaze was extinguished. 
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APPENDIX E 
The Aquarium: 
Instructions: Please read the following story carefully.  Make sure you are familiar 
enough with it so that you could retell it in your own words.  You may use the space 
below to summarize key points. 
 
A major aquarium in a city on the East Coast decided to create a large aquarium 
display containing a replica of the sunken ocean liner the Titanic amid the sea 
environment of its resting place, which is deep in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of 
Newfoundland. A professional aquarium designer was assigned to the project. She 
placed a small replica of the vessel in the center of a large tank, with a realistic sea 
bed. Then she added to the tank sea plants and fish of the sort that live in the Atlantic 
at the depth of the sunken Titanic. The display was virtually finished when the 
designer was confronted with a major problem she had failed to anticipate. In order to 
maintain the deep-water environment required by the fish and plants, the tank had to 
be kept quite dark, as the deep-water organisms were not adapted to light. However, if 
the tank was kept completely dark, people would not be able to see the small replica of 
the Titanic in the center of the tank, which, after all, was the main point of the exhibit.  
Putting lights inside the model of the wreck looked too artificial. The designer 
considered shining a powerful spotlight on the model of the vessel. However, if the 
spotlight was located inside the tank, it would raise the temperature of the water too 
high; and if it was located outside the tank, the bright beam seriously disrupted the 
feeding habits of some of the fish. So it looked like the display was going to have an 
embarrassing shortcoming. 
 
What could be done to light the display? Write your solution below. Remember to use 
the same principles that were used in the stories you read. 
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APPENDIX F 
Scrambled Sentence Test 
Below you will find 30 word-groups consisting of five words each. Your task is to 
create one grammatically correct sentence for each group, using four out of the five 
words. For example, for the word group: ran outside talked today he there are several 
possible four-word sentences you could create from these five words. Some examples: 
He talked outside today. He ran outside today.        Today, he ran outside. 
Any one of the above sentences would be an appropriate answer. Do not spend too 
much time on any one word-group, but complete the task as quickly as possible. 
Remember, you only need one sentence per word-group. 
he trusts her others quickly   
cars dogs increase noise immediately   
they are feel mostly trusted   
he sings runs with strength   
she will believe easily tomorrow   
talk run to her quickly   
the truth is long remembered   
usually they eat well never   
he speaks sincerely there today   
light turn on switch the   
she depended on them occasion   
people stores are usually downtown   
they appeared unsuspicious today usually   
trains run stop at four   
he looked spoke with certainty   
birds airplanes fly sky high   
she will disclose it books   
calculate write large numbers slowly   
be trustworthy around others him   
write letters on paper hands   
we support you today usually   
he eventually normally brings food   
they mostly usually have integrity   
she was waiting running there   
he saw met their honesty   
they slept fell inside there   
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she made them us safe   
take pictures bark of trees   
he can should trust others   
never always eat the onion   
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APPENDIX G 
Scrambled Sentence Test 
 
Below you will find 30 word-groups consisting of five words each. Your task is to 
create one grammatically correct sentence for each group, using four out of the five 
words. For example, for the word group: ran outside talked today he there are several 
possible four-word sentences you could create from these five words. Some examples: 
  
He talked outside today. He ran outside today.        Today, he ran outside. 
 
Any one of the above sentences would be an appropriate answer. Do not spend too 
much time on any one word-group, but complete the task as quickly as possible. 
Remember, you only need one sentence per word-group. 
 
he distrusts her others quickly   
cars dogs increase noise immediately   
they are feel mostly mistrusted   
he sings runs with strength   
she will disbelieve easily tomorrow   
talk run to her quickly   
the lie is long remembered   
usually they eat well never   
he speaks hypocritically there today   
light turn on switch the   
she cheated on them occasion   
people stores are usually downtown   
they appeared suspicious today usually   
trains run stop at four   
he looked spoke with uncertainty   
birds airplanes fly sky high   
she will conceal it books   
calculate write large numbers slowly   
be skeptical around others him   
write letters on paper hands   
we suspect you today usually   
he eventually normally brings food   
they mostly usually have doubt   
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she was waiting running there   
he saw met their dishonesty   
they slept fell inside there   
she made them us wary   
take pictures bark of trees   
he can should mislead others   
never always eat the onion   
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APPENDIX H 
Scrambled Sentence Test 
 
Below you will find 30 word-groups consisting of five words each. Your task is to 
create one grammatically correct sentence for each group, using four out of the five 
words. For example, for the word group: ran outside talked today he there are several 
possible four-word sentences you could create from these five words. Some examples: 
  
He talked outside today. He ran outside today.        Today, he ran outside. 
 
Any one of the above sentences would be an appropriate answer. Do not spend too 
much time on any one word-group, but complete the task as quickly as possible. 
Remember, you only need one sentence per word-group. 
 
he exercises her others quickly   
cars dogs increase noise immediately   
they are feel mostly soft   
he sings runs with strength   
she will see easily tomorrow   
talk run to her quickly   
the road is long remembered   
usually they eat well never   
he speaks rarely there today   
light turn on switch the   
she practiced on them occasion   
people stores are usually downtown   
they appeared normal today usually   
trains run stop at four   
he looked spoke with interest   
birds airplanes fly sky high   
she will send it books   
calculate write large numbers slowly   
be crowded around others him   
write letters on paper hands   
we lift you today usually   
he eventually normally brings food   
they mostly usually have desks   
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she was waiting running there   
he saw met their driver   
they slept fell inside there   
she made them us sandwiches   
take pictures bark of trees   
he can should touch others   
never always eat the onion   
  
 49 
APPENDIX I 
 
DISTRUST MINDSET MANIPULATION CHECK 
For the following words, please fill in the blanks by writing the word on the line. 
(Example: p_n_il = pencil)  
 
1  w a _    
2  f _ m _    
3  d i s t _ _ _ _  distrust 
4  l i _   lie 
5  b _ _ k     
6  d o u _ _   doubt 
7  r _ p e    
8  f o _ e _ t    
9  c h e _ _    cheat/check 
10   _ _ o n    
11  t r i _ _   trick 
12  c r _ _ l    
13  p r _ _ _   prove/proof 
14  d e c _ _ _ _   deceive 
15  i n _ _ r e     
16  s u s p _ _ _   suspect 
17  p r _ _ e     
18  s p e a _     
19  p h _ _ e      
20  r _ d e   
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27.6% 26.7% 30%
72.4% 73.3% 70%
CONTROL DISTRUST TRUST
SOLUTION 
ACCURACY
MINDSET
FIGURE 1
STUDY 1 RESULTS
Correct Wrong
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SOLUTION 
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STUDY 2 RESULTS
Correct Wrong
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